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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIO~~ FI B~T ~ .\TIOXAL BAXI(, 
l\ .. \ .. 
l)lailltiff and Hr'SJHJJ!rlent, 
-vs.-
SPI~~l\CEB. C. TA YLOI~, BAXK 
CO~I\liSSIONER OF THE STATE 
0~, FTAH and FIRST SECURrrY 
STATE HAXl(, 
Defrndrwts and Appellants, 
ca~P N 0. 9960 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
~TATE~IE~T OF NATURE OF CASE 
Thi~ i~ an action ehallenging as unauthorized in law 
and wi thont foundation in fad the order of Spencer C. 
Taylor, Bank Conunissioner for the State of Utah, which 
granted First St>enrity State Bank (hereinafter referred 
to a~ First 8Pen ri ty) a charter to establish a branch bank 
in the Cottonwood :Jfall in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DISPOSITIO~ IX LOvVER COl~RT 
The case was tried to the court, which held that the 
defendant Bank C01nmissioner abused his administra-
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tive discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
awarding the defendant First Security the Certificate of 
authorization to operate a branch. The Certificate was 
therefore rescinded, vacated and set aside, and the de-
fendant First Security was enjoined from establishing 
or conducting a branch bank in the Cottonwood Mall, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, pursuant to the said Certificate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
of the trial court rescinding and vacating the Bank Com-
missioner's action, and issuing an injunction against 
First Security from establishing a branch bank pursuant 
thereto. Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the 
judgment, and to broaden the grounds upon which such 
judgment rests by construction of the applicable branch 
banking statute via declaratory judgment that the estab-
lishment of the First Security Branch at the location 
conte1nplated within the Cottonwood Mall would be "such 
close proximity'' as to constitute "unreasonable inter-
ference" as a matter of law. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The trial court found that the Bank Commissioner 
abused his ad1ninistrative discretion in that he failed to 
take account of or ignored the recently enacted (1953) 
unique brrmch banking statute which is applicable only 
to the unincorporated areas of SaU J.~akr County, and 
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failed to tnake the factual determinations conte1nplated 
thereunder. The statute provides: 
"No branch shall be established at a location 
outside of the corporate limits of a city or town 
in such close proximity to an established bank or 
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the lntsi-
ness thereof." 
(~<·etion 7-3-6 F.C.A. 1953, as amended. Emphasis 
added.) 
A<'eordingly, one issue properly before this Court 
1~ whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to 
support the lower court's finding. 
A broader question of law is also presented by the 
record, i.e., whether under the facts of this case-which 
i~ a near ultimate case in terms of "close proximity" 
of two banks-there is "unreasonable interference" as a 
matter of law by virtue of unimpeachable facts which 
establish the sole statutory standard of "close prox-
imity." 
An additional issue before this court as to which 
the trial court failed to make a finding is whether the 
Bank Conunissioner abused his discretion in "finding" 
the existence of "public convenience and advantage," 
which is another statutory condition precedent to action 
by the Bank Commissioner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Staten1ent of Facts in appellants' brief is de-
ficient in that it fails to set forth vital findings and evi-
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dence, primarily as relates to the concept of "close prox-
imity" and its effect upon previously established bank 
business. In particular, the paraphrasing of Bank Com-
missioner Taylor's testimony tends to deemphasize the 
obvious inattention given by the said Conunissioner 
either to the statute itself or to any aspect of the busi-
ness of the Zions' branch as such might be affected by 
the granting of the First Security charter. Also, the 
findings and evidence which affirmatively show "un-
reasonable interference" by reason of "such close prox-
imity" are neglected. Accordingly, this supplementary 
recitation of facts is meant to set forth more fully the 
material facts which are felt to be determinative of the 
legal issues involved. 
Location : Close Proximity-
The lower Court found: 
"7. The Cottonwood Mall, sometimes refer-
red to as the Cottonwood Shopping Center, is lo-. 
cated in an unincorporated area of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. (R. 87, Emphasis added.) 
"8. The proposed new brane.h of defendant 
First Security State Bank will be located sub-
stantially adjacent to the present branch bank of 
plaintiff, Zions First A' ational Bank, the branch-
es being located on opposite sides of the covered 
Mall and separated by 182 feet across the width 
of the covered ~{all. (R. 87, En1phasis added.) 
* * * 
"10. Placement of the proposed branch 
bank of defendant First Securitv State Bank at 
the contemplated location within· the Cottonwood 
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Mall constitutes close pro.rimity." (R. 88, Em-
phasis added.) 
The factual support for these findings is unquestionable. 
Both defendants admitted in the pleadings that the two 
hratH'h hank~ would be "im1nediately adjacent" to each 
other. (R.5 and H. 10), and the Bank Exmniner char-
aetPrized tlw locations as "contiguous." (R. 30) The 
findings an• likPwisP ~upported h!· Exhibit P--1: (R. -1:3, 
+1), whieh is an archih•ct'~ plat ~upported by affidavit 
whi(·h shows that the branches would be located in the 
srune portion of the Cottonwood 1\lall Building, covered 
by the smne roof and separated only by 18:2 feet across 
tlw width of the :Mall itself. 
X o i 11 rest ignt ion of effect of "close proximity," "un-
r('a ..... ·oJwlde i nte rfe renee·'' or "business (of) established 
bank" 
ThP lower court found: 
••9. It affirmatively appears that no deter-
mination was 1nade by defendant Spencer C. 
rraylor, Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah, 
as to zchcthcr placement of the proposed First 
S('curity State Bank branch within the Cotton-
·zcood "'11 all zcou l d constit1tte close proximity to 
the existing Zions Cottonwood branch so as to un-
reasonably interfere with the business thereof." 
(R. 88, Emphasis added.) 
• • • 
"11. The ['close proximity' statute] ... was 
ignored, and it affirm at i z:ely appears that the 
facts "-ith respect to whether the proposed branch 
bank would unreasonably interfere with the exist-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ing branch bank were not sufficiently inquired in-
to by the defendant Spencer C. Taylor, Bank 
Commissioner of the State of Utah, prior to Octo-
ber 16, 1962, the date of execution of the Certifi-
cate authorizing the conducting of a branch bank 
by defendant First Security State Bank in the 
Cottonwood Mall ... " (R. 88, Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"12. On or before October 16, 1962, the de-
fendant Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, did not know and it affirma-
tively appears that he had not made sufficient in-
quiry to form a judgment as to what effect iu 
terms of unreasonable interference granting tlw 
application for placement of the proposed new 
branch bank of defendant First .Security State 
Bank within the Cottonwood Mall would have up-
on the business of the pre-existing branch bank 
of plaintiff located within the Cottonwood Mall 
by reason of close proximity thereto." (R. 88, 
Emphasis added.) 
• • • 
"13. It affirmatively appears that no i11-
quiry or invec'-digatiun was madr by defendant 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Connnissioner of the 
State of Utah, nor the State Banking Department 
before granting the Certificate on October 16, 
1962, as to the effect which granting the First 
Security State Bank application would have upon 
the business of the pre-existing Zions Cottonwood 
Branch Bank by reason of proximity thereto." (R. 
88, Emphasis added.) 
Chief Bank Examiner Quinn conducted an investiga-
tion for the Banking Department (R. 28-38) and inquired 
jnto various matters and areas of in1portanee whieh were 
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rPgardPd hy Bank Conunissioner Taylor as adequate and 
calling for all "essential infol'lnation" (Dep. 6). How-
PVPI', the invP~tigation failed to call for a finding or in-
formation relative to the unique law applicable to un-
incorporatl'd area.s of Salt Lake County, i.e., the effect 
(po~~ible llllrl'a.souablf' interference) upon the business 
of an ,.,. .. ,.faf,fislll'd bank by reason of the "close pro.rimity" 
of a proposf'd branch bank. 
The Bank Cmnmissioner neither made nor caused 
to be mad<> any ~tudy or investigation rPlativ<> to the 
matter of tlw possible <'ffect which "close proximity" 
might have upon the business of the Zions Cottonwood 
Branch. Actually, it seems clear that any ideas the Com-
missioner had as to "close proximity" were very general 
and not based 'Upon facts applicable to the specific situa-
tion, or for that matter upon facts of essential considera-
tion under the statute applicable to the unincorporated 
areas of Salt Lake County: 
"Q. And you considered close proximity in the 
Cottonwood Mall area in the same sense that 
you would consider it in Salt Lake City 
proper1 
A. Yes, or Logan or Brigham or Cedar City. 
Q. Or any other area¥ 
A. Yes. 
( Dep. 62. Emphasis added.) 
Q. . . . Have you ever had any occasion to make 
any studies of the effect that proximity has 
to the business of a pre-existing branch bank, 
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that is proximity of another competing 
branch bank~ 
A. I have made some observations. Down in 
California they put a branch on one corner 
and following a few days (doors~) from there 
there would be a branch on the other corner, 
just cater-cornered. And I don't know what 
the reasoning is but banks seem to want to 
compete with each other right on the ground. 
Q. Have you made any studies in Utah on this 
matter~ 
A. Just as I have stated, that wherever there are 
banks that they are generally-where there 
is more than one bank they are generally in 
pretty close proximity." (Dep. 63. Emphasis 
added.) 
Commissioner Taylor testified that for purposes of 
his decision he made no special finding as to the matter 
of close proximity (Dep. 67), although by the time of his 
deposition he did regard the placement of the two banks 
in the proposed location within the same building as 
"close proximity" (Dep. 67). Actually, the Cmn1nissioner 
had the rather startling notion that banks in "close prox-
iinity" would actually benefit each other, which was cer-
tainly not based upon an)~ investigation of banks, but 
rather appeared to be based upon hearsay as to certain 
other businesses : 
"Q. Is it your state1nent that You believe that 
placing a competing branch. bank right next 
to a pre-existing branch bank could help the 
first bank~ 
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:\. \Yell it creates 1nore business. 
(~. For what braneh? 
A. Both banks. 
Q. ll ow does placing First Security right next 
to Zions bring In ore business to Zions~ 
.\. \Vell it brings 1nore business to the area. 
Q. But doel:l it bring 1nore business to Zions~ 
A. 1 think so. 
Q. Have you ever 1nade any studies to show that 
placing a branch right next to another one 
actually helps the first branch~ 
A. I have read a lot on the subject and this is 
true lcith grocery stores and gasoline stations 
and :·.:lwe stores. 
~[r. Nebeker: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
.. BY 1\IR. GREENE: 
Q. Do you think that placing First Security 
State Bank where it is intended to be placed 
would help the business of Zions~ 
A. I think it would create a healthy situation. 
Q. But would it increase the business volume of 
Zions~ 
~\. I donJt know. That is a loaded question; I 
don't know. 
Q. \V ell do you have any reason to think that it 
would actually increase the business volume 
of Zions? 
A. -v;ro, I zcouldn't have any." 
(Dep. 63, 64. Emphasis added.) 
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As to the matter of possible unreasonable interfer-
ence or adverse effect 1tpon the business of the Zions' 
Cottonwood Branch bank, Commissioner Taylor failed to 
inquire into any aspect of the business of the Zions 
branch. This in spite of the fact that the unusual quality, 
design and size of "Salt Lake area's finest suburban 
bank" (R. 26) was emphasized to the Bank Commission-
er, and he recognized the "lush" nature of the Zions' 
branch and that such "was in keeping with the rather 
nice decor and nature of the decorating in the Mall itself." 
(Dep. 33) (See representative pictures-Exhibit P-5.): 
"Q. Now did you make any studies with regard 
to the expenses of Zions First National Bank 
Cottonwood branch~ 
A. No. I had no occasion to do that. 
Q. Did you consider the cost of its leasehold! 
A. I had no occasion to do that. 
Q. The matter of its square footage~ 
A. No. 
Q. Or the kinds and types of business equipment 
that it had~ 
A. No. 
Q. The cost and the number of employees and 
personnel employed to operate that branch? 
A. No. 
Q. 'The expenses per month~ 
A. Of Zions~ 
Q. Yes. 
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A. No." 
(Dep. 43) 
~\.lthough tlw C01nn1issioner testified that the ''break-
l'l'l'n'' J)()int was and is an essential consideration in 
analysing profitable branch banking (R. -!3), he made no 
inquiry into t hP factors which would establish the break-
PYPn point of tlw Zions-Cottonwood branch (Dep. 43, 44). 
The Bank ( 1om missioner had no knowledge of th<> critical 
matter of Zions' Cottonwood Branch deposit '0·ol1une at 
any ti1ne during the pertinent period of time before the 
Fir~t SPeurity application was granted (Dep. 56, 57), 
and he made no c01nputations as to Zions' deposit volume 
or as to thP total potPntial deposit volume for all banks 
and financial institutions in the so-called "bank service 
area." (Dep. 81) It had been called to his attention, and 
Conuni~~ionPr Taylor was well aware, that the Zions 
Branch was so located and planned as to have foregone 
tlw free ~tanding, drive-in type bank business (Dep. 33) 
and that its success depended upon attraction of the busi-
ness accouJits primar·ily u·ithin the Mall itself (R. 26). 
Also, the Conunissioner knew that First Security empha-
sized as a condition to its anticipated success in the area, 
the acquisition of "business accounts primarily from the 
shopping center itself ... " (R. 20). Notwithstanding 
these facb, Commissioner Taylor failed to make or cause 
to be made a study or survey as to the effect which plac-
ing another institution within the Mall would have upon 
the potential attraction of business accounts away from 
Zions' previously established business. 
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As a n1atter of fact, the only evidence Commissioner 
Taylor had before him as to the effect granting this ap-
plication would have upon Zions was that it would be 
detrimental to Zions. The allegation in plaintiff's Com-
plaint, that Zions had presented evidence to the Bank 
Commissioner that the plaintiff "is losing money as a 
result of the operation of its branch in the 'Cottonwood 
Mall' and that the addition of another branch in the area 
would have an adverse financial effect upon the business 
of the Cottonwood Branch of the plaintiff," was admitted 
(R. 5, 10). Officials of Zions, both by letter and confer-
ence, emphasized to the Commissioner that the branch 
would need at least a three-year period of time after the 
shopping center opened to "become self-sustaining" (R. 
26) and to get "on its feet" (Dep. 34). (Zions' formal 
opening was June 4, 1962 (Dep. 32); about half the stores 
were open in the Mall by the time Commissioner Taylor 
granted the First Security charter (R. 24) ; the formal 
opening of the Mall was in Spring 1963.) 
Overbanking: No nred for additional banking facili-
ties-
The lower court found: 
"5. C. B. Quinn, Chief Exa~niner for the 
Utah State Banking Department, undertook an 
official examination of the facts and circum-
stances relative to the application of First Se-
curity State Bank for a branch in the Cottonwood 
Mall and prepared a written report to defendant 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, relative thereto. The said report 
was filed with defendant Spencer C. Taylor~ Bank 
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{ ~onunissimwr of the State of Utah, in the spring 
of 1 ~Hi~, and concluded that granting the applica-
tion of defendant First SPeurity Bank would cre-
atP an O/'('r-/)({nked co11ditio11 and that no need ex-
ists for additio1utl banking facilities in flu' area 
in quP~tion." (R. 87, E1nphasis added.) 
rrhe Quinn l'Pport (H. 28-38) inquired into and estab-
li~hP<l faet~ a~ to tlw statutory require1uent of "public 
eonYenience and advantage," ,,·hieh is applicable to all 
areas of the ~tatP where branch banking is pennitted, 
including tlw unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County. 
'flw eondusions of this report, based upon the factual 
~tndy eontained therein, were adverse to "public con-
venience and advantage": 
"It is this exmniner's opinion that the grant-
ing of applicant's proposed branch will create an 
ovcrba nk('d condition." 
(Itelnl4(a), R-35. Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"It is this examiner's opinion that no need 
c.rists for additional banking facilities in this area. 
In the very core of the primary area involved there 
are three operating banking facilities and one sav-
ings and loan outlet. On the fringe of this area 
there are two operating banking facilities (one of 
~Chich ,is operated by the applicant) and one which 
has been approved but not yet established." 
(Item 1-1-(b), R-35. Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"Applicant's (First Security's) projected esti-
Dlate of potential deposit volume may be o ce rly 
optimistic zclzen compared to the experience of 
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the established banks in the general service area." 
(I tern 16, R-35. Emphasis added . .) 
* * * 
"A protest against the granting of this branch 
was entered with this department on November 28, 
1961 by the Zions First National Bank. No other 
formal protests have been filed with this depart-
ment against the establishment of the proposed 
branch. However, the officers and managers of 
the financial firms that are represented in this 
area were of the opinion that the area is being 
well serviced with present facilities and the grant-
ing of an additional _facility would not be ethical 
or proper." 
(Item 26, R-38. Emphasis added.) 
The Quinn report was filed with Commissioner Taylor 
in the Spring of 1962, perhaps as late as June (Dep. 11). 
At the time it was filed Commissioner Taylor agreed with 
all aspects of the report, including the conclusions and 
comments stated above (Dep. 59, 69, 75). On or about 
October 16, 1962, Commissioner Taylor told :Jfr. Quinn 
that he was "going to decide against him," but ~fr. Quinn 
never advised .JI r. Taylor that he had changed his mind 
as to the report or the 1natters contained therein (Dep. 
7'7, 78). However, on October 16, 1962, in conference 
with Governor Clyde, Commissioner Taylor's mind was 
changed, and the applieation of First Security was grant-
ed (R. 28). Cmnmissioner Taylor had before hin1 no addi-
tional studies or reports upon which to base a decision in 
effeet overruljng his own Banking Department. 
Probably the 1nost erucial single faetor '''ith regard 
to "public convenienee and advantage,'' whieh in Yo lye~ 
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thP ttnestion of .. nPPd'' for other banks and "overbank-
ing," i~ the 1natter of ratio of banking institutions per 
('a pita of population within the primary or "bank service" 
an·a. ~\~ to this 1natter Cmn1nissioner Taylor discarded 
the only evidence before him, which was supplied by 
First SPeurity. That evidence was that one branch bank 
pPr 10,750 population within the ''primary bank service 
area" is "generally standard" (R. 19). Cmnmissioner 
Taylor said that his standard was one branch per 8,000 
to 10,000 people: 
"Q. I am trying to get what your standard would 
be in determining whether or not an area is 
overbanked in terms of population. 
A. I say eight to ten tl101tsand people." 
(Dep. 52. E1nphasis added.) 
As to the nu1nber of units per population within the ''bank 
servicl' area," which area was defined both in the First 
~t•curity application (R. 19) and the Quinn report (R. 34) 
as tltt• area between 3900 and 7800 South Streets and be-
twPPn 900 East and the "\Vasatch l\Iountain Range, Mr. 
Taylor agreed that the seven branches listed by Examiner 
Quinn (R. 30) would compete within the "bank service 
arPa," which contains a population of approximately 
43,000 people ( R. 19 ; R. 34; Dep. 46). He further agreed 
that bank:5 on the fringe of the area obtain the "bulk of 
their potential deposit volume . . . from the primary 
area in question." (Dep. 7 4) 
The net result as to the population factor is that 
Comn1issioner Taylor recognized that at least eight in-
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stitutions within the bank service area "would directly 
compete with each other." These are: 
Zions First National Bank, Cottonwood Mall 
Branch 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., Holladay Branch 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., County Office 
Valley State Bank, Cottonwood Branch 
Valley State Bank, 56th South Branch 
Valley State Bank, Olympus Branch 
First ~Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Highland 
Drive Branch 
First Security State Bank, Cottonwood Mall 
Branch 
Simple mathematics shows that 8 into 43,000 is one 
branch per every 5,375 people, well below the Bank 
Commissioner's own standard, and about one half the 
standard as advocated by First Security. This excludes 
the banks on the fringe of the area which the Commission-
er recognized would also compete. It should be carefully 
noted that this analysis is very conservative, and does not 
take account of the effect of a pending branch applica-
tion of lVfurray State Bank at 7335 South Ninth East 
(east side of street) ( Dep. 49), the Beehive State Bank 
branch application at 9400 South Seventh East (Quinn 
Report R. 37), the Western Savings an~ Loan Office 
within the Cottonwood !1all (Quinn Report, R. 30) or the 
Olympus Hills Branch of First Security State Bank 
which is just outside the area in question but which Mr. 
Quinn fmmd to be servicing the area in qu.estion (Quinn 
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Report, lten1 2ti, H. 38). It should be noted that the con-
tPm plated branch of .Murray State Bank was to be lo-
<·nted within Uw prhne ~PrvieP area some three 1nilP~ 
do~Pr than thP pPnding Beehive State branch application 
which .1/r. (Juiun had predicted would overlap the trade 
a n·<t ( lten1 :2:~, R. :ri). Al~o, it is pertinent here to oh~Prve 
that siucc fl1e hcarill!J an additi(nwl branch bank charter 
//((,..,. heen fJI"<tllfed in the same area, namely, a charter to 
\r alkPr Bank & Trust Con1pany "'in the inunediate 
vit·inity of 3900 South and Highland Drin~" which further 
~atnrah'8 the "bank service area" and dilutes the gross 
available to each competing institution in such a manner 
as to accentuate the problem of "overbanking" already 
found to exist in the area. If all of the banking institu-
tions enumerated were to be considered in assessing the 
nutth•r of bank-population ratio as bearing upon "public 
<'OllYPniPnee and advantage," we would have at least 
hn'lvP institutions, whieh, 'Ylwn divided into 43,000, gives 
the ridiculous and obviously unworkable ratio of one bank 
per 3,583 people! 
Ha11k Conuni::;sioller's "Investigation" as to "growth 
of the JlaW': inadequate and based upon incompetent 
''data''-
The lower court found: 
"1!./. No substantial evidence and no substan-
tial competent evidence was before the defendant 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, from any source upon which to 
base a determination that the proposed establish-
nlent of the First Security State Bank branch in 
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the contemffia~d location within ~he. Cottonwood 
Mall wouldA'1fe in such close proxrm1ty as to un-
reasonably interfere with the business of the pre-
existing Zions Cottonwood Branch Bank." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The deposition of Comrnissioner Taylor clearly dem-
onstrates that he based "his" decision to grant First 
Security's application upon a nonstatutory test, i.e., the 
purported "growth of the Mall" (Dep. 30, 36, 55, 75, 78), 
though the supposed growth as disclosed by the deposi-
tion was nothing more than guesswork. This was also 
the basis for a purported "determination" that the busi-
ness of Zions' Cottonwood branch would not be unreason-
ably interferred with. Commissioner Taylor testified: 
"Q. Well now in determining that placing First 
Security there wouldn't unreasonably inter-
fere with Zions, I believe you said the prim-
ary consideration was the growth of the Mall, 
is that right~ 
A. Right. 
Q. Now were there other cousiderations in mak-
ing that determination that there wouldn't 
be unreasonable interference~ 
A. Oh none except that I have every confidence 
in Zions First National Bank." 
(Dep. 80. Emphasis added.) 
As to the alleged "gro-v{th of the Mall," the Commis-
sioner relied aln1ost exclusively upon his own personal 
observations. The naturP of these observations was 
casual- ''just a matter of walking around the }\[all and 
watching the progress" (Dep. 19). J\fr. Taylor felt that 
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t lw Mall .. was a trPmPndous thing" ... +J)ep. 25), but there 
was no atteinph•d ~eientific analysis or factual determina-
tion: 
"l 1nade no study. The extent of my study, 
as I told yon, was visiting the Mall and watching 
the growth out there." 
(Dep. 58) 
rrlw first "observation" of Cmn1nissioner Taylor was 
with n•gard to supposedly large nu1nbers of people using 
tlw ~(all. Hmn•ver, ~lr. Taylor's "infonnation" was 
hasPd upon sunnise and speculation and even events sub-
:·:eqn('llf to the granting of First Security's application: 
"A. Yes. I was out there I guess before Christmas 
and we jttst couldn't find a parking place 
tl1 ere, as 1nany parking places as they have. 
Q. That was before Christmas 1962? 
_.A. Yes. 
Q. "\Yas there a ti1ne before October 16th, 1962, 
that you couldn't find a parking place? 
A. X o, I don't believe so. 
Q. TT' ell the crozcds of people that you are par-
ticularly talking about would be the Christ-
mas shoppers then, is that right? 
A. Yes." 
(Dep. 23. Emphasis added.) 
As to the potential number of bank customers in the 
pertinent areas, Cmn1nissioner Taylor never became 
aware and IWYer n1ade or caused to be made any survey 
as to the number of people using the Mall (Dep. 24), and 
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he had no knowledge a~ to what areas the people using 
the I\iall came frmn (:Dep. :2-1, 25). Notwithstanding the 
lack of factual data, Mr. Taylor 1nade some personal 
guesses, such as the state1nent that the ~Jall would ·• ... 
draw probably beyond the areas that either bank would 
draw frmn ... " (Dep. -14) and that a store within the 
Mall, such as ZCMI, "draws frmn all oYer tlw State" 
(Dep. -±4), but he 1nade no study to determine what pull, 
if any, applicable to banking there might be from areas 
beyond the "bank trading area" described in the Quinn 
report (Dep. 57, 58). Further,.Comn1issioner Taylor said 
that he did not consider the population (Dep. 57) or the 
effect of other existing branch banks within the larger 
"shopping center trading area", although he stated that 
that would have been proper had the larger area been 
considered (Dep. 58). 
The next "observation" made by Commissioner Tay-
lor was as to the businesses within the Mall. It had been 
estin1ated by First Security in its application (R. 20, 21) 
and in the Quinn Report (R. 33) that some 50 businesses 
would be established within the ~fall in the course of its 
completion. Mr. Ta~-lor observed some of these pre-
viously contemplated businesses open for business to the 
public, and by the time he granted First Security's appli-
cation he estin1ated that about half of the forecasted 
businesses had opened (Dep. 2±). However, as to any 
specific analysis of the matter, it was apparent that the 
whole rationalization was largely an afterthought, and 
specifjr data relative thereto had been compiled only 
after granting the application to First Security. Some-
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tillw u.l'tPr ( )dolH'l' l(i, 19(j2, nlr. Taylor obtained a list 
ot' bu~inP~~P~ which had as pn·dicted opened for business 
within the nlall (Dep. :23, 2-!): 
"(~. How 1nany of the some predicted 50 husi-
nP~~ establish1nents would you say had been 
opened by the tilne October 16th, 19():2, rolled 
around? 
.\. I wouldn't tell yon witho1tt rejerri11g to tl1e 
d u tes there. 
A. 
The dates y01t have refcrcuce to would be on 
the 1 ist that U'as supplied to ill r. Nebeker? 
Yes. 
(~. \Vell would you say based upon your recollec-
tion that half of them-
A. I would think so, yes." 
( Dep. :2:3, 2-1-. Emphasis added. See also Taylor 
Dep. 1-l:-18, \Vhich was stricken by agreement 
since it related to matters obtained subsequent to 
the granting of the application.) 
;\dually, ~I r. rra~·lor could point out no business estab-
lishment within the nfall which opened before the First 
~Pcurity application was granted (Oct. 16, 1962) which 
wa~ not anticipated or known at the time of First Se-
curity'~ application in November of 1961 or at the time 
the Quinn report "·as subn1itted to Com1nissioner Taylor 
in about April of 1962. 
The personal contacts made by Commissioner Taylor 
were equally casual. First, and foremost, ~Ir. Taylor 
stated that he relied upon information supplied by Wayne 
F. Richards, the manager of the Mall. Virtually all of 
that inforn1ation, which was vague in any event, was 
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supplied to Commissioner Taylor after he granted the 
application, so it was stricken by agreen1ent from the 
record. (See Taylor Dep., page 14, line 18 through page 
18, line 28.) Next, Mr. Taylor referred to a brief and very 
casual conversation with Sid Horman, the builder of the 
Mall. The conversation, in 1lr. Taylor's words, was not 
"pertinent" ( Dep. 19), had nothing to do with the bank-
ing business ( Dep. 22), and consisted primarily in con-
gratulations for the marvelous job done at the Mall 
(Dep. 22). Mr. Taylor also talked with Scharf Sumner 
on a casual occasion at the opening within the :Jfall of 
Western Savings and Loan (Dep.19). 
In his deposition, Commissioner Taylor stressed the 
'"growth" of the Mall, but the record fails to show 
"growth" in the sense of the addition of things new or in 
the sense of enlarging the basic physical plant. The Cot-
tonwood Mall Building itself was fundamentally com-
pleted at the time Mr. Quinn made his report, and the 
largest store-ZCMI -had opened some time prior to 
the Quinn examination. However, Mr. Taylor testified 
that certain elusive "changes" came about from the peri-
od of the receipt by hin1self of the Quinn report (Spring 
1962-perhaps as late as June (R. 11)) to the date he 
granted the application of First Security (October 16, 
1962 (R. 39) ). Upon analysis, these "rhanges" weren't 
reall~' an~·thing new: 
"Q. With regard to the 1\Iall itself, did you con-
sider that something had changed between 
the time that Mr. Quinn filed his report with 
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you and the tilne that you granted the appli-
cation t 
A. Y P8. I think the growth of the Mall and the 
type of businesses they got out there were 
quite a factor. 
Q. But hadn't ~lr. Quinn taken that into con-
sideration, the probability that these things 
would be opened as outlined in the First Se-
('Urity State Bank application 1 
A. Well the statement, where he concluded, I 
think probably he might have done." 
(Dep. '76) 
"Q. You say the population had changed in the 
six-month period 1 
A. Yes, the population had grown too. 
Q. How much had the population grown-
A. I couldn't answer that. 
Q. -from the spring of 1962 to the fall of 19621 
A. I couldn't answer that but it is growing at a 
rapid rate. 
Q. Did you have any figures to make you think 
that-
A. I didn't take this into consideration. I told 
you the primary deciding factor with me was 
the growth of the Mall itself." 
(Dep. 78) 
It is a~~Prted by counsel for appellants that Zions 
Bank had "every opportunity" to put evidence, facts and 
argument h~~fore the Commissioner (Appellants' Brief, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
pp. 23, :2-1), and that the approach the Bank COimnis-
sioner took was to follov{ "the rnethods of the business-
nlan" (Appellants' Brief, pp. 2.6, 27). It is true that 
Zions had presented facts to the Commissioner concern-
ing probable darnage and injury to its business as well 
as other facts bearing upon the statutory conditions of 
"public convenience and advantage" and "close prox-
imity." (As a matter of fact, the evidence presented by 
Zions was the only evidence fr01n any source which the 
Commissioner had before him as to "unreasonable inter-
ference" due to "close proximity.") With regard to the 
alleged "growth of the Mall," Zions presented no evi-
dence or information because it was totally unaware that 
the matter had become an issue in the Bank Commission-
er's mind. There was no changed condition or growth 
beyond what had been planned and fully anticipated. (As 
a matter of fact, the only change ·was the substantial 
delay which came about in accomplishing what had been 
planned.) It was known that salient facts respecting the 
M_:all and the area were before the Commissioner and that 
the Chief Bank Exan1iner had made an official investi-
gation respecting these n1atters. There was no additional 
evidence to be presented as to these matters! 
As to the "businessrnan's" approach, Zions Bank had 
fully assurned that businesslike data and factual informa-
tion ·would be ernpJo~~ed in rendering the decision. In-
stead, the decision ·was based upon speculations of 2\Ir. 
Taylor as to the "growth of the Mall," without benefit 
of any factual study or survey, without any Bank Exam-
inr>r'~ investigation of such alleged "growth'' and 1rithout 
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nnlit't' or t'i'<'ll the sllf/.f/1'.';/inJI tu /:ioJ/s Bank that the 
:-;uppt•:-;t·d growth "·a:-; being eon~idt·rPd. In this <·omw<·-
t i1111, it should IH' dearly noh·d that there was 1w hearing 
u~ to ~I r. Taylor':-; "ill\'P:-;tigation~·· and tlH·n· was 110 ill-
ritatiou hy Counui~~ionPr Taylor to rPpresentativ<·~ of 
Zions Bank in order for thmn to prP~Pnt their views and 
t•Yidt'll<'t' on the subjeet of th<' alleged "growth of the 
~lall" (Ta:dor Dep. 36) . 
. Al{U Ul\lENT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTION OF THE STATE BANK COMMISSIONER 
OF UTAH IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF FIRST 
SECURITY STATE BANK FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
BRANCH WITHIN THE COTTONWOOD MALL, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, UTAH, WAS VOID IN THAT THERE WAS UN-
REASON ABLE INTERFERENCE BY REASON OF CLOSE 
PROXIMITY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Tlw 1 ~).);) mnend1nent to the Utah branch banking 
8tatntf\ whirh i~ applicable o11ly to the unincorporated 
areas of Salt Lake County, provides: 
"~Xo branch slwll be established at a location 
outside the corporate li1nits of a cit:v or town 
in Sitch close pro.1·i mity to an establislz rd l)(wk 
nr branch as to 1n1reasonably interfrre 1cith the 
lws in rss t hr reof." 
(F.C.4-\. 1953 1-3-6, a~ mnended. Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that a declaratory judgment should 
he rendered interpreting this statute, which has never 
been construed, to forbid rirtually ad.facrnt and contigu-
Oits branch banki11g in Salt Lake Cnwlfy. 
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The sole statutory standard with reference to the 
existence of "unreasonable interference" with the busi-
ness of an "established bank or branch" is u such clos:e 
proximity." Under our statute, "close proximity" is 
equated with "interference". The statute forbids "un-
reasonable interference," which is to be ascertained 
solely by "such close proximity." Accordingly, the legis-
lature contemplated that there would be situations where 
a proposed branch bank location relative to a pre-
established bank or branch location would itself be un-
reasonable. Since the effect of contemplated locations 
would obviously vary depending upon distance or "prox-
imity" from the pre-established banks or branches, the 
statute contemplates a factual determination by the 
Bank Commissioner as to which locations would be so 
close as to be unreasonable, except that some locations 
would be so close as to be unreasonable as a matter of 
law. Such "bedrock" locations would be those placed 
adjacent, contiguous, and virtually munder the same 
roof" with pre-established banks or branches. Such loca-
tions go beyond mere "close proximity" and become 
u such" close proximity within the statutory prohibition. 
Hence, it might be said that adjacent or contigious 
branch banks in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake 
County constitute unreasonable interference per se. If 
the statute isn't violated in such situations it could never 
be violated! 
In any event, it is submitted that under the facts 
of this case there is "unreasonable interference" by rea-
son of "such close proximity" as a matter of law. The 
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fad~ hPrein prP~Pnt a "bedrock" or near ulti1uate situa-
tion in tPrlll~ of <'l<>~<'nP~~ of branch bank locations. Addi-
tionally, t hP n·eord affi rmat i rely shows that injection 
of tlw nPw branch bank within the Cottonwood ~lall in 
"Hueh <'I<>~~' proximity'' would "unreasonably interfpn•" 
with the .. established" Zions branch bank. (As to this 
matter, among other things, Chief Bank Examiner Quinn 
had officially reported the existence of "overbanking" in 
the area and "no need" for furth8r banking facilities 
( R. 35). Another branch charter in the same area could 
only aggravate the situation to the detriment of the pre-
established branch bank.) 
The arguments herein submitted are made without 
benefit of precedent. Not only is the statute under con-
sideration uniquely and solely applicable to the unincor-
porated areas of Salt Lake County, but it appears to be 
a uniquely worded type of branch bank prohibition, no 
preeise statutory or case precedents being existent from 
otlwr jurisdictions to the "Titer's knowledge. It will be 
helpful, therefore, to consider the general historical de-
velopment of our branch banking statutes in order to 
ascertain the legislatiYe intent and public policy con-
~idPration~ applicable thereto. 
~\s a preli1ninary n1atter, it should be recognized that 
banking is a necessarily regulated industry, being "af-
ferh'd with the public interest.'' (7 A1n. Jur., Banks and 
Banking, ~ertion 9 at p. 30; 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, 
~Pdion -1:2 at p. 80. See also Italy c. John so 11, 200 Cal. 
1. :2;) 1 Par. 7S-1 (Calif. 19:2/).) In this connection, this 
l'ou rt ha~ rerognized the publir's concern in branch bank-
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ing and the necessity for restrictions. (Union Trust Co. 
v. Simmons) 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 196 (1949)) (Peti-
tioner conceded in this case the right of the legislature 
to prohibit branch banking in Utah.) 
Until 1933 branch banking was absolutely prohibited 
in Utah, as it still is prohibited in a majority of states. 
(7 Am. Jur., Banks and Banking, Section 23; 9 C.J.S., 
Banks and Banking, Section 55) Since 1933, Utah has 
permitted branch banking in certain areas and under 
certain conditions. Caution in the expansion of branch 
banking in this state is apparent from analysis of strin-
gent conditions which our legislature has imposed, which 
conditions fundamentally express the public policies of 
protection of the general public, as well as protection of 
the pre-established banks. Recognition of the evils of 
"overbanking" is apparent by the imposition of the said 
eonditions. In this connection, the requirement of pro-
moting the "public convenience and advantage" (pro-
tection of the general public) was enacted in the original 
statute (Laws of Utah 1933, Chapter 6) and has been 
carried forth as a condition relative to all areas wherein 
branch banking is permitted. (P.C.A. 1953 7-3-6, as 
amended . .) Also, the requiren1ent that a branch "take 
over an existing bank" (protection of pre-established 
banks) was in the original statute, and is still mandatory 
in some areas where branching is permitted (U.G.A. 1953 
7-3-6, as amended). Accordingly, in 1951 when dealing 
with a city or town other than a city of the first class, 
the legislature maintained that absolute prohibition un-
der certain conditions, as to the entire city or town. 
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( Ln\\·~ or t'tah 1 !l.->1, ClutptPr 10) That i~. in:-;tPad of thP 
.. ,·ln~t· pro:xilllit<' t<·~t. thP entirP corporate limits of an 
org·anizPd muni<·ipal <·orporation wa~ wwd a:-; tht> bound-
ar~. ThP eondition::-; madP applieahlP wpn• that if an e~­
lahlishnl IHIIIk II'Us O)J<'I'a!illf), no nPw branch could lw 
t·~tahli~hPd un\p:-;:-; tlw bank ~Peking to <-'stablish the 
brnneh touk urer II/(' Uj)('J'(tfillq bank. Then, to further 
rl'~t riet tlw ~pn·<Hl of branch banking, it was provided 
that a unit bank in ~lH'h eity or town could not be taken 
oYPr as a branch until it had lwPn in operation as a unit 
hank for a period of fire year • ..,·. This law is still applic-
ahl<-'. ( l ·.( 1 • .\. 1!).);3 7-:;-li, a~ mnended.) 
\YIH•n th<> legislatnn>, h:· mnendrnent in 1953, came 
to dPal for th(' fir.-,·t time \\·ith th<· establishe1nent of a 
branch in an lf.JiiJI(·orJJorated area, it had to find appro-
priatP JangllH,!..!,'I'. (:~ ote; the (JII[Jf unincorporated area 
whPrPin branch banking i~ permitted at all is Salt ·Lake 
County, sincP ~alt Lake i::-; the only county which con-
tains a cit:· of tlw first class as required by the statute. 
A~ to unincorporated areas of other countiP~, the pre-
] !l:~:~ policy of absolute prohibition still applies.) The 
lPgislatnre eould not ·well say, as it had done "·ith respect 
to a city or town, that only one branch bank could be es-
tablished in the entire unincorporated area of a county. 
It ,,·as IWe<-'ssa ry that it look to the realities and impose 
such restrirti on~ as were reasonably comparable to those 
applicable in the case of cities and towns. Hence, "close 
prn:\imit:·" was used as the area concept instead of the 
t•nti n· town or eit:·. and the formula of "unreasonable in-
tt•rt't•rt·lH'P .. with ''establi~lwd bank ... business" as occa-
~in1wd hy "such closr }Jrruimify" \Yaf' used to enhody 
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the concept already applicable to incorporated areas, 
nan1ely, protection of existing banking institutions and 
the general public from overbanking and unwarranted 
competition within the same basic area. 
Based upon the plain wording of the statute, as well 
as apparent legislative intent from analysis of the branch 
banking statutes, it is submitted that the "close prox-
irnity" statute should be construed as a matter of law 
to prohibit extremely close, "side by side" type banking 
locations, and in any event the contemplated location of 
First Security should be so construed in this case. 
POINT II. 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE DEFENDANT BANK 
COMMISSIONER ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN IGNORING 
THE "CLOSE PROXIMITY" STATUTE AND IN FAILING TO 
MAKE 'THE FACTUAL DE'TERMINATIONS CONTEM-
PLATED BY THE SAID STATUTE. 
The trial court held that the action of the Bank Com-
missioner in granting a branch bank charter to First 
Security was null and void in that it ·was without founda-
tion in fact, thus constituting an abuse of administrative 
discretion. The holding is based upon the finding that 
the "close proximity" statute was not inquired into, and 
determinations conternplated thereunder were not made. 
This assumes, notwithstanding the admitted existence 
of "such close proximity," that there were still factual 
determinations to be made by the Bank Commissioner 
relative to the effect of "such close proximity," i.e., 
whether such would constitute -"unreasonable inter-
ference" with the business of the "established bank or 
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branch." rrhis WHS thP theory Of the statute adopted by 
t ht> trial eourt, which is vigorously defended herein! 
The "elosP proximity" statute constitutes a limita-
t·ion or resfrict·iou upon the Bank Connnissioner in that 
it spts forth a mandatory coudition or standard that must 
hP followed. The recitation of facts as set forth herein 
denwnstratPs that th(' Bank Commissioner failed to com-
ply with tlw said statutory condition precedent. Actual-
ly. tlw facts show that notwithstanding the existence of 
"<'lose proxilnit~·" in this situation, the Bank Commis-
~ioner failed to inquire into the effect which the said 
"<'lm;p proximity" would have upon the established busi-
ness of Zions, no investigation having been 1nade in 
order to ascertain tlw existence or non-existence of "un-
reasonable interference." 
\Vith regard to the applicable law, it will be well 
first to comment with reference to the authorities con-
tained in Appellants' Brief. Generally speaking, there 
i~ no quarrel with the authorities contained therein. There 
appears to be an attempt, however, in the use of certain 
authorities, to suggest a near absolute and unrestricted 
admini~trative discretion in banking matters. That is 
ePrtainly not tlw law applicable in this jurisdiction in 
riell' of our ('.!pre . .,·~ ~tatutory coJlditions and prohibitions. 
HenrP, the quotation from Professor Davis and the au-
thorities construing the federal banking statute are in no 
wi:-;p appropriate with reference to Utah law. The rea-
son for this is that the federal law contains almost no 
rt-'strirtions as to the actions of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, in sharp contrast with the Utah statute as to 
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the actions of the Bank Commissioner. Thus, in Com-
munity National Bank of Pontiac v. Gidney as Comp-
troller of the Currency, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Michi-
gan 1961), it was noted as to federal banking that there 
was a Congressional intent "to place in the hands of the 
Comptroller almost complete control over many aspects 
of banking." (192 F. Supp. at 517) In this connection, the 
court commented upon ". . . the failure of Congress to 
provide any standards by which this court could deter-
mine whether the exercise of discretion by the Comp-
troller was 'reasonable' or whether it was 'arbitrary' ... " 
(192 F. Supp. at 519) 
It is submitted that the action of the Bank Commis-
sioner with reference to the matter of granting or deny-
ing branch bank charters in unincorporated areas of Salt 
Lake County (as well as the other areas of the state) is 
limited by standards and must be based upon substantial 
competent evidence. In this connection, the Bank Com-
missioner's action could not be based upon nonstatutory 
tests or upon personal "investigations" not factual in 
nature. The applicable principles of law are as follows: 
1. Limited Discretion of the Bank Commissioner-
Conditions Precedent. 
While it is proper to speak of an abuse of discre-
tion as the standard in judging the propriety of the 
decision of the Bank Commissioner, it is not proper 
to consider that discretion in terms of an unlimited 
discretion. It is submitted that certain statutory 
standards have been given which must be followed by 
the Bank Com1nissioner and which must guide a re-
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viewing t'OUrt in dt>t'iding the qw·:.;tion whetlu•r or not 
his dP<·i:.;ion wa:.;, in l';wt, arbitrary or capricious. This 
is ulwrn book" law applicable to ad1ninistrative de-
<'i:.;ion:.; in general: 
"~irwv such action is not in accordance with 
law, is in PXePss of authority, and presents a judi-
C'ial qnesfio11 or a que::;lion of lau· fur the coHrt, a 
eourt on revil·\\· of action of an administrative 
agen<'y, under express provisions of smne statutes 
but even i11 the ab::;cnce of statutes providing for 
.i udicialreview or relief and in the face of statutes 
purporting to preclude judicial review, this being 
a nmttPr of constitutional right in son1e instances, 
will pass on, and in a proper case grant relief 
from or set aside, agency action, findings, and con-
clusions which are arbitrary, capricious, or both 
or either, lfll1'casrmalJlr, or arlJifnt1·y or unreason-
a/Jle. O'r an abuse of power or discrrtion." 
504, ;)0;). (Emphasis added.) 
This Court has often taken note of these principles 
of administratin• law, representative statements of 
tlw doctrine appearing in t\YO cases involving review 
of derisions of the Departnwnt of Business Regula-
tion: 
"If thPy should fail to regularly pursue their 
authority. or refuse to do so, or act in any manner 
which is arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory 
as to the applicant, recourse to the courts is avail-
able." 
Clayton z:. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 
(1956) 
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"Should the department, or its exanunm~ 
committee, fail to so properly discharge its duties 
or act in any manner that is capricious or arbi 
trary, the applicant would not be at the mercy oJ 
said department of such committee, but recours~ 
to the courts would be available." 
Alexander v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 163, 298 P.2c 
823 (1956) 
It is well recognized law that where statutor) 
standards are given, state banking department offi. 
cials may not exercise an unlimited or absolute dis-
cretion. Statutory standards and conditions must be 
complied with, and such compliance is a condition 
precedent to valid administrative action. The Utah 
statute provides two fundmnental standards, both of 
which must be inquired into by the Bank 'Commis-
sioner in justification of any purported decision 
granting an application for branch banking in un-
incorporated areas of Salt Lake County. The first is 
the matter of "public convenience and advantage" 
and the second is the matter of "close proximity"-
"unreasonable interference" (U. C.A. 1953 7-3-6, as 
amended). In other areas of the state, additional or 
other standards are applicable. Hence it was recog-
nized in the Utah case of Union Trust Company v. 
Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 196 (1949), that 
"petitioner has not complied with any of the require-
ments for the establishment of a branch bank under 
this method." (The method referred to was the law 
applicable to Ogden, Utah, wherein it was necessary 
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to takt> ovPr an Pxi~ting unit bank in order to establish 
u hranch tlwrPin.) 
In Jl'all r. Fenn('r, 7t> So. Dak. 252, 7G N.\V. 2d 
7~~ (H. Dak. 1956) nmnda1nus to review denial of 
application for a bank charter was rejected and the 
Bank Com1nission's discretion was upheld. However, 
tlw <·ourt emphasized the responsibility in terms of 
standards of the Commission: 
''When the Commission acts on an application 
it must, in carrying out this legislative mandate, 
determine questions of fact. In making such de-
termination the Commission of necessity exercises 
a discretion. However, this statute does not give 
the Connnissio11 an ttnlimited or absolute discre-
tion. Its actions must be based on determinations 
of facts ... It requires the 'Commission to inquire 
into specifird factual areas thus limiting the Com-
Ill ission' s concern to the areas enumerated." 76 
N.,V. :2d at 724. (Emphasis added.) 
Arrord, Speer 1'. Dossy, 177 Ken. 761, 198 ·S.W. 19·, 
~() (Ky. 1917) wherein the court pointed out that the 
han king ad!ninistrators' " ... discretion must be exer-
<'i~Pd only within the limits prescribed by the statute." 
Tlw ea~P of Daughin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 
:~ss PPnn. -+++. 130 A. 2d 686 (Penn. 1957) involved 
a proceeding for approval of articles of merger of 
two hanks, which had been denied by the Department 
of Banking. The order of the Department of Banking 
disapproving the said articles of merger was reversed 
since the Department had based its decision upon a 
nonsta.tutnry test. The statutory standard was 
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whether the 1nerger was made for a "legitimate pur. 
pose," but the Banking Department had disapprovec 
the 1nerger on the ground that there was "no need". 
In Moran v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W. 2d 
772 (:Mich. 1948), a suit was commenced to vacate 
and set aside an order by the State Banking Depart-
Inent and for permission to organize a new bank. 
The court upheld the applicants and directed the Bank 
Commissioner to grant their petition, holding that 
the Bank Commissioner had erroneously refused to 
grant the charter because of a mistake in the inter-
pretation of the statutory 1neaning of the term 
"necessity." The court said: 
"In the light of the foregoing we are con-
strained to hold that the plaintiffs did establish 
'necessity' for another barik in Detroit and that 
as a matter of law defendant erred in his concept 
of the scope and meaning of necessity as used 
in the particular statute, which error primarily 
resulted in denial of plaintiff's petition." 
33 N.W. 2d at 779 
('The later Michigan case of Bank of Dearbourne v. 
Taylor, 365 Mich. 567, 114 N.W. 2d 210 (Mich. 19·62) 
involves a different result, but the same principles, 
in that the court emphasized the matter of the exist-
ence of a special law and of the standards set forth 
in particular laws. This is one of the cases wherein 
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tlw <'ollrt in upholding ~w·h di~eretion observed that it 
wa~ ahl<· to do ~o only sincP thPn: \Vas an absence of 
a statutory provision prohibiting cmnpetitive banking. 
Had thP L'tah statntP been in effect it is sub1nitted 
that a different result would have followed.) 
2. ~uh~tantial Competent Evidence Rule. 
Lt is submitted that there is no substantial evi-
denre upon which the alleged finding of noninterfer-
<'tH'P as occasioned by close proximity could be based 
fr·om this record. Certainly the self-serving and legal-
ly ohj~:etionable portions of First Security's applica-
tion (H. 1-1:-:2-t) do not constitute competent evidence 
upon which alo11e the decision could have been based. 
A<"eordingly, a Motion to Strike the legally insuffi-
('ient portions thereof was filed. In any event, it is 
patPntly apparent that the First Security application 
wholly fails to i11quire i11to the crucial matter of the 
c.ffcct of close pro.rim-ity upon the b1tsiness of Zions-
Cottonwood branch. The application doesn't even 
purport to set forth any facts ·with respect to these 
matters. _-\..~ to tlw Bank Com1nissioner's "investiga-
tions'' and n:-:P of alleged "Inethods of the business-
man" (_AppPllants' Brief, pp. 23, 2-!), it is submitted 
that ~ueh does not qualify as competent evidence. As 
a matter of fact, the alleged "businessman" type 
methods in fact were speculations as to possible 
"growth of the ~Iall'' without benefit of factual data 
or snrYPY of any kind. In any eYent, it is clear that 
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the Bank Commissioner n1ade no inquiry as to the 
effect such close proximity would have upon the busi-
ness of Zions. Actually, the only evidence before the 
Connnissioner as to this matter was that the business 
of the Zions branch would be unreasonably interferred 
with, which would support a ruling directly opposite 
to that rendered by the Commissioner. 
In any event, the rule is well established that 
there rnust be substantial competent evidence in the 
record on which to base such an administrative deci-
sion. It is submitted that there was and is no such 
evidence in this case. It is recognized in administra-
tive law that the administrator is not bound by the 
ordinary rules of evidence. But nevertheless, there 
is still applicable to his actions the "legal residium 
rule," i.e., that his decision must rest upon substantial 
evidence. Where is such evidence in this case~ 
This Court has been consistently insistent upon 
such requirement. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Public Service Com'n., 5 Utah 2d 230, 300 P.2d 600 
· ( 1956), the court said : 
"·The legislature has clothed the Commission 
with plenary power to determine public conven-
ience and necessity and to decide what common 
carrier shall render service. 'The findings and con-
clusions of the Commission on questions of fact 
are subject to review by this court only to deter-
mine if they find substantial support in the rec-
ord." 
The substantial evidence in question must also be 
legally competent : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
" ·[ t i~ not required that the facts found by 
t hP 'Commission be conclusively established, nor 
even that they be shown by a preponderance of the 
PvidPIH'P. lf then· is in the record competent evi-
dt>nrP frmn which a reasonable mind could believe 
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding 
of such facts find~ justification in the evidence, 
and we cannot disturb it.' " 
Cintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commis-
:;iun, 119 Utah 491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951), 
ttuoting Mulcahy v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 101 Utah 2-!5, 117 P.2d 298 (1941). 
l.n the case of ill oormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah 
:t~-1-. :27 P.2d +!7 (Utah 1933) this Court was consider-
ing a proceeding for the revocation of a physician's 
license. The Doctors' Board didn't have presented to 
it competent evidence upon which to base its recom-
mendation relative to the physician in question. The 
court held that the physician's Board had no jurisdic-
tion to enter its order since it wasn't based upon com-
petent n:idence (:27 P.2d at -152). Further, this Court 
ha~ held that an adininistrator cannot proceed to 
render a deci:;iuu ignoring competent evidence which 
would be ind icat ire of a different result (which is the 
situation which we submit exists in this case), Jones 
v. California Packing, 121 Ftah 612, 244 P.2d 640 
(rtah 19;):2). (Held, the Industrial Commission can-
not disregard con1petent evidence and render a con-
trary decision notwithstanding the existence of smne.) 
The F nited States Supreme Court has defined 
"~nb~tantial evidence" to be: 
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" ... evidence which is substantial, that is, 
affording a substantial basis of fact from which 
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. (au-
thorities cited) Substantial evidence is more than 
a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspi-
cion of the existence of the fact to be established. 
'It 1neans such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
1nind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion,' (authorities cited) and it must be enough 
to justify, if the trial ·were to a jury, a refusal 
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to 
be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." 
(Emphasis added.) 
National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Columbian E. & B. Co., 
306 U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501, 83 L. Ed. 660 
(1939). 
(Banking cases accord: In re Commercial State Bank 
of Scottsbluff, 105 Neb. 248, 179 N.W. 1021 (Neb. 
1920); Application of Millbnrn - Short Hills Bank, 
59 N.J. Super. 470, 158 A.2d 66 (Superior Court N.J. 
1959); Farb v. State Banking Board, ______ Tex.------, 343 
S.W. 2d 508 ('Tex.1961)) 
It is submitted that upon analysis as to the "evi-
dence" before Commissioner Taylor relative to the 
matters of close proximity and unreasonable interfer-
ence with the business of Zions ·Cottonwood branch, 
such was neither substantial nor competent. ·The al-
leged determination was without foundation in fact! 
3. Personal Investigations by the Bank Commissioner. 
It is very clear that Commissioner Taylor actual-
ly based the decision which he rendered upon his 
own personal observations, which, to say the least, 
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Wl'rt' non~eit>ntifie and certainly speculative. There 
wa~ no invitation to representatives of Zions to pre-
~Pnt to the ( ~onunissioner evidence and facts as to 
the allPgPd "growth of the Mall." So, certainly, there 
wa:-; no opportunity for the exchange of information 
or eonfrontation of thP supposed "facts" in the Cmn-
mi~~ionpr':-; po~~Pssion (Dep. 36). 
The law in thi:-; umtter appears to be clear: 
"Even though an administrative authority 
has statutory power to make independent investi-
gation~, it is improper for it to base a decision or 
findings upon facts so obtained, unless such evi-
deneP is introduced at a hearing or otherwise 
hro1tght to the kuowledge of the interested parties 
prior to derisiou, witlz an opportunity to explain 
and rehllt." 
Anno. Ad1ninistrative Law-Evidence, 18 A.L.R. 
:2d 552, 562. (Emphasis added.) 
Further, the authors of American Law Reports have 
statNl: 
"\Yhile it is ou1·io1tsly improper for an ad-
mini,-.·tratiL·e tribunal to make a view of premises 
or physical inspectiou of a person without giving 
notice to tlzc interested parties, the courts are 
not in agree1nent as to whether the facts observed 
by the trier of facts at such an occasion may con-
8titute a proper basis for the decision without 
bei nq made a part of the record and ~resented 
to the parties. 
··on flzc one hand, it has been held that the 
knozdedge qaiued by an administrative authority 
.from a rie1r of premises cannot be made the basis 
nf drrision, unle . .;:s the perti·nP'nf facts are made 
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part of the record and brought to the attention 
of the parties." 
Anno. Administrative Law-Evidence, 18 A.1L.R. 
2d 571-572 (Emphasis added.) 
. (A split of authorities is noted as to this matter, but 
it is submitted that the better view is as quoted and 
indicated.) 
The principle in law that is particularly stressed 
is that the administrative decision must be based upon 
known evidence and not secret evidence. Hence, the 
authors of American Jurisprudence have stated: 
"The principle that administrative adjudica-
tions must be made upon known evidence applies 
to any kind of information obtained by the ad-
ministrative agency secretly and at a time or 
place other than that appointed for the hearing, 
including ex parte testimony and affidavits, evi-
dence taken prior to the time the one against 
whom the decision runs was made party to the 
proceeding, and individual's own record, undis-
closed statements or views of subordinates within 
the agency, the report of a hearing officer to the 
agency, and the report or recommendations of ad-
visors to the determining agency." 
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law,§ 384 at page 
191 (Emphasis added.) 
A case that is very pertinent with regard to this 
matter is the banking case of Elizabeth Federal Sav-
ings & Loan v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (N. 
J. 1957). In that case the court held that where the 
determination of the banking commissioner obviously 
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rested in part upon infonnation of which the objecting 
bank had no notice or access, the proceeding should 
ht· remanded tu thl' uank comm,issioner for further 
findings and detennination based upon facts. The 
court in~isted upon a cmnpletion of the record so that 
further findings and a substantial basis could exist 
n·lativl' to the detennination of the bank cornmission-
PI'. The court then pointed out: 
.. Nevertheless, without recogn1z1ng them as 
'parties' he ( Con1missioner) afforded the object-
ants an opportunity to present whatever evidence 
and argument they had in opposition to the appli-
cation of Colonial. These proceedings, however, 
could by no n1eans be characterized as a full hear-
ing in the true sense of that word. While the ob-
jecta nts u:ere given every opportunity to present 
thrir own evidence, they were in substantial re-
spects denied the opportunity to meet the evidence 
on the other side of the case and that relied upon 
by the Commissioner. Some of the evidence was 
furnished Px parte by Colonial to the Commis-
sioner and not made available to the objectants." 
1~~~ .A.2d at 782 (Emphasis added.) 
ln the ea~P at bar, Zions was never given an op-
portunity to meet the very "evidence" upon which 
Commi~~ioner Taylor relied in 1naking his decision, 
i.P., alleged .. growth of the :Jfall." Certainly evidence 
could han• been presented by Zions to the Commis-
sioner as to deposit volume, population, available 
busine~~ accounts and other data applicable and pecu-
liar to the banking problem at hand as related (or 
more properly not related) to the alleged "growth of 
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the :Mall." No evidence of any kind was before the 
Commissioner as to the relationship, if any, between 
the apparent growth of the Mall and the probability 
of noninterference occasioned by close proximity. 
This type of evidence could and should have been 
solicited by the Commissioner. 
It is submitted that the basis for the alleged 
"findings" of the Bank Commissioner-his own secret 
personal observations-was and is insufficient in 
law. It could in no wise be considered as competent 
evidence, and since it was essentially secret and non-
disclosed, it was improperly considered in any event. 
POINT' III. 
THE PRESUMED "FINDING" BY THE BANK COM-
MISSIONER OF THE EXISTENCE OF "PUBLIC CONVEN-
IENCE AND ADV AN'TAGE" WAS WITHOUT FOUNDATION 
IN FACT AND CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DI8CRETION. 
The applicable statute imposes the additional statu-
tory requirement that adequate inquiry be made into the 
matter of "public convenience and advantage." The stat-
ute provides : 
"No bank shall be permitted to establish any 
branch or office until it shall first have been 
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commission-
er and the governor that the public convenience 
and advantage will be subserved and promoted 
by the establishment of such branch or office and 
the bank commissioner may by order permitting 
the establishment of such branch or office desig~ 
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nate and limit the character of work and service 
whieh may therein be performed." 
(HPetion 7-:~-f), U.C.A. 1953. Emphasis added.) 
ThP lower <·ourt found that the Chief Bank Exmniner 
<'lt>nrly d.Ph•rmined on the lntHiH of a factual study the 
lack of need for ((II ({(/ditional/)((JtkillfJ institution in the 
arfa, and the fact of ot'l'rhallkillff in the area. However, 
thP lowPr eourt preferred to base its decision upon the 
:-;olP ground of abuse of administrative discretion relative 
to thP ''eloHP proximit~·'' statute and requirements there-
under. It is equally true, however, that while the Bank 
I lt>partment didn't ignore the matter of "public conven-
it'll<'P and advantage,'' the facts which were before the 
Bank ·Commissioner did not justify his decision of the 
PxistPtH'P of ''publie convenience and advantage" and 
t lw decision was without foundation in fact. Certainly, 
the written report of the Chief Bank Examiner failed to 
justify sneh a decision. There was no additional study 
or report before the Bank Commissioner upon which to 
ha:-;p a dPrision in effect overruling his own Banking 
Department. 
·The ~nnw principles of law as ~Pt forh under Point II 
above a~ relating to applicable standards regarding abuse 
of dj~erPtion and the necessity of administrative deter-
mination:' lwing founded in substantial competent evi-
dence are applicable hereto. 
"~ith regard ~pecifirally to the Inatter of the <>vii 
of "overbanking", which our legislature surely meant to 
eliminate hy reason of the standard of "public conven-
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ience and advantage," the following authorities are sub. 
mitted: 
In Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 378 
Pa. 311, 106A.2d 416, 423 (Penn. 1954) the Pennsyl. 
vania court said : 
"The legislature ... did not exclude or intend 
to exclude competition between banks; it intended, 
inter alia, to exclude such competition as would 
likely weaken or destroy some banks in an over 
banked community and thus weaken or injure the 
entire banking system to the detriment of deposit. 
ors, creditors, stockholders and the public alike." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In line with this judicial pronouncement is the eco-
nomic and social viewpoint, summarized thusly: 
"In the field of banking ... it is firmly estab-
lished that the benefits of unrestricted competi-
tion are not worth the inevitable price ... " 
H arfield, Legal Restraints on Expanded Banking 
Facilities, Competition and the Public Inter-
est, 14 Business Lawyer 10116 (1959) 
The relationship between proper competition and 
the public interest is astutely crystalized in an article 
appearing in the Banking Law Journal which thorough-
ly analyses the purport of the factor of "public conven-
ience and advantage": 
"Healthy competition is desirable, but compe-
tion in an over -banked area is disastrous. The 
standard will be interpreted so as to further the 
prime public interest in having a sound banking 
system. It may be that a monopoly will be the 
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incidt.•ntal result of the furtherance of the superior 
social inll'rl'sf.'' (Empasis added.) 
Stokes, Puhlit Colll'l'nience and Advantage iu 
Applitalions for 1\~('U' Banks and Branches, 
7-t. Banking Law Journal 921, 929 (1957) 
CONCLUSION 
It i~ rt-~}H'<'tl'nlly sub1nitted that the action of the 
~tntP Bank Commissioner in granting First Security's 
application is void as a 1natter of law. The Utah Legis-
lature recognized that at some point the factor of close 
proximity would result in unreasonable interference. 
CPrtainly, that point is reached in contiguous or adjacent 
hranch banking. Our "close proximity" statute should be 
~o construed. In any event, in the face of the "bedrock" 
and virtually ultimate situation of "close proximity" 
under the fact~ of this case, the existeence of "unreason-
ahlP interference" by reason of "such close proximity" 
lweanw a matter of law, and the application of First 
~~·~·urity should be rejected by virtue of the clear exist-
f•ncr of the sole statutory standard of "s1tch close prox-
imity.'' 
In any t'H'nt it is subn1itted that the judg1nent of the 
trial court should be affirmed in that there is substantial 
evidPnce to support the findings that the action of the 
Statt· Bank Comn1issioner constituted an abuse of admin-
in~trative discretion, such being \Yithout foundation in 
fact. In this connection, the record is clear that the statu-
lor.'! requirement of measuring the effect of close proxi-
mity upon the business· of the prr-establisJzed branclz 
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bank was totally and wholly ignored! The Commissioner's 
alleged ''determination" as to this matter is not support-
ed by substantial evidence and in fact is not supported by 
any information of any kind. This is true in that it af-
firmatively appears that no inquiry was made or attempt-
ed by the Bank Commissioner into this matter, and the 
only evidence bearing upon the Inatter was presented by 
rPpresentatives of Zions and was to the effect that the 
proposed new branch bank would unreasonably interfere. 
Substantial competent evidence supporting the al-
leged "determination" by the Bank Commissioner that 
the proposed new branch would satisfy "public conven-
ience and advantage" is lacking. The facts contained in 
the report of Chief Bank Examiner Quinn, which Com-
missioner Taylor accepted as facts, demonstrate that be-
cause of the population, deposit volume and other factors 
bearing upon "overbanking" in the area, there was not 
only a lack of public need, but the presence of probable 
detriment both to the public in general and to the banking 
institutions in the area in particular! 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff-respondent re-
spectfully seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial 
court rescinding and vacating the Bank Commissioner's 
action and issuing an injunction against First Security 
from establishing a branch bank pursuant thereto. Plain-
tiff-respondent also respectfully seeks affirmance of the 
judgment on the broader ground that the proposed lo-
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c·ation of the First ~(·<·nrity branch bank would violate 
the l'close proximity" ~tatntP as a matter of law. 
H<'~fH•ett'nlly submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
J. Thomas Greene 
Paul B. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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